Using a global M&A data set, this paper provides evidence that the empirical observations relating public acquisitions to, at best, zero abnormal returns, and their stockfinanced subset to negative abnormal returns for acquiring firms around the deal announcement are not unanimous across countries. Acquirers beyond the most competitive takeover markets (the U.S., U.K., and Canada) pay lower premia and realize gains, while share-for-share offers are at least non-value destroying for their shareholders. In contrast, target shareholders within these markets gain significantly less, implying that the benefits generated are more evenly split between the involved parties.
I. Introduction
The fundamental aim of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) is the generation of synergies that can, in turn, foster corporate growth, increase market power, boost profitability, and improve shareholders' wealth. Accordingly, M&As should constitute positive net present value projects.
Nonetheless, the key result emerging from the majority of empirical studies, mainly concentrated in the U.S. and the U.K., is that acquiring firms' shareholders experience either normal returns or significant losses around the announcement of acquisitions involving publicly listed targets.
1 A plausible explanation for this persistent puzzling phenomenon is that the market for corporate control of public companies is excessively competitive (Mandelker, 1974; Asquith, 1983) . As a result, acquirers tend to bid more aggressively and offer hefty premiums to target firms that, in effect, capture most of the acquisition benefit and enjoy significant price appreciation. Along these lines, Billett and Qian (2008) argue that fierce competition for listed targets is likely to enhance managerial hubris-related effects that, due to the winner's curse, can lead to reduced gains for acquirers. 2 In addition, the presence of competition can exacerbate the negative effects of agency problems discussed by Jensen (1986 Jensen ( , 2005 .
While acquiring a listed target should be, in general, a competitive task, progressively characterized by auction-style contests with a plethora of entrants (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987; Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 1988; Schwert, 1996; Boone and Mulherin, 2007) , some markets are still, to a large extent, more competitive than other markets for corporate control. Rossi and Volpin (2004) , for instance, document that premiums are persistently higher in the U.S. and the U.K., where the volume of transactions and the degree of competition are higher and the shareholder protection regime is stricter. Therefore, the potential for value creation for acquirers when buying a listed target within the most competitive markets is limited. Alternatively, settings in which competition for public targets is less intense should be characterized by relatively lower premiums and a more even split of the benefits between the involved parties.
Given that the degree of competition in the market for corporate control differs across countries, the question that naturally arises is whether the well documented failure of public acquisitions to create wealth for acquiring firm shareholders is a worldwide phenomenon.
Accordingly, this paper examines, using a global sample, whether public acquisitions can create value for acquiring firms' shareholders in countries beyond those with the most competitive acquisition markets. We also investigate whether gains to acquirers (premia and gains to target firms) are negatively (positively) associated with the degree of competition for listed targets after controlling for firm and deal characteristics, variables that reflect differences in the legal and institutional environment across countries, and other country fixed effects.
We measure market competitiveness as the percentage of listed companies within a country targeted in completed deals in a specific year. Based on this measure, we find that the U.S., U.K., and Canada (hereinafter UUC) are the most competitive among all acquisition markets as they have, on average, the highest percentages of listed firms being acquired.
Accordingly, the mean premiums paid in public acquisitions within these countries are 45.79%, 42.02%, and 37.01%, respectively, compared with only 31.91% in the rest of the world (hereinafter RoW). The mean (median) premium paid in the UUC is typically 41% (47%) higher than in the RoW. Contrary to previous studies in major acquisition markets, acquirers beyond the UUC are subject to statistically significant (at the 1% level) abnormal gains of 1.56% around the acquisition announcement. Moreover, mean acquirer abnormal returns are at least non-negative within the Rest of Europe, Japan, Rest of Asia, Oceania, South Africa, and South America. The return difference between RoW acquirers and their counterparts in the three most competitive markets is 2.93%, statistically significant at the 1% level. Results on target returns reveal that the average RoW target experiences almost half the gains of a corresponding UUC target, implying that the benefits generated are more evenly split between acquirer and target firms within the RoW.
Moreover, we provide evidence with significant implications related to the payment mode effect on acquirer returns in public acquisitions. Previous studies, mainly covering the U.K. and U.S. markets, document that transactions conducted solely with cash are at least non-value destructive, while acquirers offering equity to finance acquisitions suffer extensive losses (Travlos, 1987 and Walker, 2000 , for the U.S. and Draper and Paudyal, 2006 for the U.K.).
However, if competition for public targets and, as such, the premiums offered are inferior in some markets, the negative information effect of an equity offer can be subsided by the positive effect of the low premium paid. In this case, the net effect on the stock price of the acquirer around the announcement is ambiguous and not necessarily negative. According to this conjecture, we document that the equity payment effect is not as widespread a phenomenon as common stock payments within the RoW are associated with positive abnormal returns to acquirers. The abnormal return difference between RoW and UUC acquirers that opt to pay with stock is 3.9%, while the large return differentials between the two groups of acquirers hold irrespective of the method of payment used.
Although cross-country variations in the competitiveness of the market for corporate control can qualify as a potential explanation for the differentials in acquirer and target returns between the RoW and UUC, there are other differences among the countries examined that may affect the results that must be controlled for. We find that the level of competition across time and markets is, in general, negatively associated with acquirer returns and positively associated with takeover premiums and target returns after controlling for deal, firm, legal, and institutional characteristics across markets and other country fixed effects. The documented relationships also hold within the RoW and UUC subsets, confirming that our results for the entire sample are not merely due to differences in competition between the two groups.
Our work offers important contributions. First, we demonstrate that public acquisitions beyond the most competitive acquisition markets do not necessarily destroy value as documented in prior literature. Along these lines, we document that even equity offers are at least non-value destroying within less competitive markets suggesting that the negative signaling effect of stock swaps is diluted when competition in the market for corporate control is less intense. Second, existing literature has established a positive (negative) association between target returns or the offer premium (acquirer returns) and the degree of competition in M&As within the U.S. market.
For instance, Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) report a negative correlation between the occurrence of a competing bidder and acquirer returns while Servaes (1991) and Schwert (1996 Schwert ( , 2000 report that multiple bidder contests increase target returns and takeover premia, respectively. Moreover, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) report that industry liquidity and acquirer returns are inversely related. We complement this literature by providing evidence based on a less homogeneous sample, in terms of competition, that allows us to look more broadly into the magnitude of competition in determining acquisition gains and premia. As a result, we establish that premia, acquirer, and target firms' wealth effects in public acquisitions are related to variations in the competitiveness of the M&A market.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and methodology used in our investigation and discusses sample statistics. Section III reports acquirer and target abnormal returns by country groups, and multivariate regression results.
Section IV provides our conclusions.
II. Data and Methodology
The sample of acquisition announcements is from the Officer (2003) . The correlation between mean yearly competition and median premium in Table I for 32 mutual observations is 0.42 (statistically significant at the 5% level), which is an indication that the premium paid for listed targets around the globe increases with the level of competition.
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Insert Table I about here.
Since our focus is on public acquisitions, we subsequently further truncate our sample and exclude deals in which the bidder is not listed. We concentrate on domestic transactions, which constitute 82% of all public deals worldwide, since premia and gains to acquirers in crossborder acquisitions may reflect the value of shifts in investor protection (Bris and Cabolis, 2008) .
Further, inter-border transactions may amplify the information asymmetry between the acquirer's managers and shareholders. This may temporarily introduce uncertainty regarding the prospects of the new entity and, in turn, distort any potential opportunity for short run value creation stemming from the relative illiquidity discount at which a target is purchased. We omit deals with incomplete payment method data and those in which the transaction relative size, defined as the transaction value over the acquirer's market value one month prior to the acquisition announcement, is less than 1% and the value paid for the target is less than $1 million. 5 We also exclude transactions in which the acquirer has multiple acquisition announcements within the window used for the calculation of abnormal returns. Finally, we require that the bidder and the corresponding stock exchange have data available in Thomson Financial Datastream. We obtain 4,577 transactions in 39 countries that satisfy these criteria.
The five-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated as in Faccio et al. (2006) by adding the market-adjusted return of each acquirer for days t-2 to t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. To calculate the daily market return, the corresponding country's
Datastream value-weighted market index return is used. 6 We follow the same procedure when calculating abnormal returns for target firms. Abnormal returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to remove outliers. Total acquisition gains are calculated using the market valueweighted average of the acquirer and target abnormal returns where market values are measured one month prior to the acquisition announcement. 5 We use the transaction value as a proxy for the target's market value as our sample decreases significantly when using the target's market value. Our results, however, are very similar when using the target's market value in the relative size calculation. 6 For instance, the TOTMKUS Datastream index is used for the U.S. We also calculate abnormal returns for the U.S. using CRSP data; we obtain qualitatively similar results, but for consistency, we report findings using data from TF Datastream. Acquirer CARs are at least non-negative beyond the U.S., U.K., and Canada. Instead, they are positive and significant within markets that are also characterised by lower premiums.
Target firms, on the other hand, gain sizably less in the RoW region relative to the UUC. Results on gains to acquisitions around the world are further analyzed below.
Insert Table II about here. they destroy value. In particular, the mean (median) abnormal return for the entire sample of acquirers is -0.91% (-0.80%), statistically significant at the 1% level. The average (median) U.S., U.K., and Canadian acquirer is subject to statistically significant negative abnormal returns, at conventional levels, of -1.34%, -1.58%, and -1.54% (-1.11%, -1.24%, and -1.42%), respectively. Accordingly, the average acquirer among the three most competitive acquisition markets (UUC) experiences losses of -1.38%, statistically significant at the 1% level.
III. Empirical Results

A. Acquirer Gains by Transaction Country Group and Method of Payment
Insert Table III about here.
The picture however is clearly different for transactions beyond the UUC. Strikingly, abnormal returns for acquirers in the RoE, Japan, and South America are, on average, positive (1.65%, 2.45%, and 2.32%, respectively) and statistically significant at conventional levels, while they are non-negative for the remaining subsets. Particularly compelling is the unreported finding that in 11 of 15 RoE markets, public acquisitions yield, on average, gains for the acquirer, while the three of those that yield losses comprise only 12 observations. The RoW subset includes all transactions beyond the UUC. Both the mean and median abnormal returns to bidding firms in the RoW are positive (1.56% and 1.10%, respectively) and statistically significant at the 1% level, reflecting that public acquisitions are, in general, value creative for acquirers beyond the most competitive takeover markets. The mean (median) return difference between RoW and UUC acquirers is 2.93% (2.25%), significant at the 1% level.
Regarding the method of payment, consistent with prior literature, U.S. acquirers that exchange their stock experience losses (mean and median are -2.27% and -1.91%, respectively, both statistically significant at the 1% level), while cash transactions yield positive returns and outperform stock deals. The picture is similar in the U.K. where cash transactions result in insignificant abnormal returns. Further, Canadian acquirers exhibit statistically significant losses in stock offers, while such losses are insignificant for the remaining subsets. Mean (median)
abnormal returns for the UUC are 0.44%, -2.29%, and -1.25% (0.35%, -1.96%, and -1.17%) for cash, stock, and mixed/other payments, respectively, statistically significant at the 5% level or better. It is particularly interesting, however, that results for the RoW subset are inconsistent with our results for the UUC and previous findings reported in the literature. More specifically, both cash and stock transactions yield positive and statistically significant abnormal mean and median returns for acquirers. The average (median) acquirer paying with cash in the RoW experiences a 1.72% (1.19%) gain, statistically significant at the 1% level. Strikingly, stock swaps are also value creative for acquirers, with the corresponding average and median abnormal returns being 1.63% and 1.22%, respectively, statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, equity payments result in non-negative abnormal returns for all reported countries/regions within the RoW subset. Overall, the return differentials between the RoW and UUC acquirers are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels irrespective of the method of payment used.
B. Target and Combined Returns
We have established that in RoW acquisitions, bidders can benefit more than in UUC acquisitions. Given that RoW targets tend to share with bidders any potential benefits arising from the transaction, their shareholders should benefit less than in the UUC region. Table IV, Panel A reports market-adjusted returns to target firms by transaction region and method of payment. While the average abnormal return for all targets is 17.65%, RoW targets experience less than half the gains (9.04%) as compared with UUC targets (19.65%). This is consistent with higher premia being offered, on average, for listed targets within the UUC markets. Further, targets paid with cash outperform targets exchanging their stock for both groups. Overall, the UUC targets outperform RoW targets by a large margin irrespective of the method of payment used. It becomes obvious that gains from acquisitions are more evenly split between target and acquiring firms within the RoW.
Insert Table IV about here.
If the differences in acquirer and target gains within those groups reflect only a redistribution of gains from target to acquiring firm shareholders, then we shouldn't observe large differences between combined shareholder gains in the two regions. Panel B reports market value-weighted combined gains to shareholders. Combined gains within the UUC and RoW are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for all except the UUC stock swap subset, which is associated with normal returns. It appears that in this subset, the positive abnormal return that targets earn is fully offset by the extensive losses of their counterpart acquirers.
Differences between the UUC and RoW samples are statistically insignificant at conventional levels for cash and mixed payments, but significant at the 1% level for equity offers (2.45%).
C. Are Return Differentials Due to Competition?
Results from the univariate analysis demonstrate that the well documented losses experienced by acquirers are confined within the UUC segment, while RoW acquirers that exhibit gains largely outperform their UUC counterparts. Although the UUC markets have been characterized as the most competitive, it is still not clear whether the return differentials obtained in the previous sections are due to competition. If competition for listed targets is a key determinant of gains to acquisitions, then abnormal returns to acquiring (target) firms should systematically decrease (increase) with the time-varying competition measure, defined in Part II, and this relationship should also persist within the UUC and RoW subsets. Therefore, in this section, we perform multivariate tests to further examine the impact of competition for listed targets on acquisition gains and to also control for other deal-and firm-specific characteristics, cross-country variations in the legal and institutional environments, and other unobservable country differences. We also employ various other controls as independent variables in Regression (1).
Travlos (1987) reports that in public acquisitions, acquirers offering stock underperform by a larger margin than acquirers paying with cash. The author attributes this difference to the fact that, due to information asymmetry, shareholders perceive stock financed acquisition proposals as signals that managers believe their equity is overvalued. We also find that the coefficient of a dummy that takes a value of one when the acquirer offers its stock and zero otherwise is negative and significant at the 1% level. Moeller et al. (2004) show that small acquirers outperform larger ones in the U.S. and they offer several explanations for the prevalent role of acquirer size as a main determinant of gains to acquisitions. We also report a negative and significant coefficient, at the 1% level, for the natural logarithm of the acquirer's market value one month prior to the acquisition announcement. Moreover, the acquirer's value has been shown to decrease with the target-to-bidder relative size in public acquisitions (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Travlos, 1987; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Servaes, 1991) . Fuller et al. (2002) find that this relationship holds for all but cash financed transactions. This variable takes a negative and significant coefficient at the 1% level, reflecting that, in general, larger public acquisitions are associated with lower returns.
It has also been shown that acquirers with high Tobin's q are favoured more by investors (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1989; Servaes, 1991 Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) indicate that the massive wealth destruction during the 1998-2001 merger wave can be, to a great extent, attributed to high q acquirers. The market-to-book ratio, which is used as proxy for Tobin's q, takes a negative, but insignificant coefficient in our regression. Further, the coefficient of a dummy that takes a value of one if the two-digit SIC codes of the acquirer and the target are different is positive and significant at the 10% level, implying that diversifying deals create more value. 9 We also find a positive, but insignificant relationship between hostile deals and acquirer returns. The presence of at least one competing bidder in the public acquisition process decreases acquirer abnormal returns. Finally, the sixmonth, pre-announcement, market index return coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that acquirers perform better during market up-turns. In Regression (2), we add country dummies to control for unobserved differences between countries, the coefficients of which we do not report. While the coefficient of the competition measure decreases, it remains negative and statistically significant at the 1% level when including country fixed effects.
In Regressions (3)- (5), we control for, along with the deal-and firm-specific variables, fixed legal and institutional characteristics among countries that may also affect the results. 10 La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) report significant variation in regulations related to the legal protection of shareholders around the world, and Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that higher premiums are paid for targets within countries with stronger investor protection regulations, such as the U.S. and the U.K. The authors also argue that stricter investor protection regimes are associated with lower costs of raising external financing and, therefore, higher transaction volume and competition for targets. Although it is not possible to attribute with certainty any potential differences in takeover premiums or gains to acquisitions to either competition or legal protection, we need to establish whether our results can be merely attributed to differences in the legal environment across countries. Thus, we include a fixed cross-country legal protection index from Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell (2008) in Regression (3). This is the product of an anti-director rights indicator from La Porta et al. (1998) and the law-and-order indicator from icrgonline.com. According to this index, from the countries covered in their study, the U.S., U.K., and Canada offer the strongest legal protection to shareholders, while Mexico and Brazil provide the weakest. If acquirers in countries with weaker investor protection pay lower premiums, then acquirer gains are expected to be higher. Accordingly, the coefficient of the legal index is negative and significant at the 1% level. 11 Nonetheless, the impact of competition remains negative and significant at the same level when including the legal index.
In Regression (4) negative and significant at the 10% level in Specification (5), although this is mainly driven by the U.S. and Canada.
In Specifications (6)- (10), we repeat the same procedure, but only for the RoW subset.
The majority of control variables, except acquirer size and past market performance in some specifications, are statistically insignificant here at conventional levels. All other controls, with the exception of the acquirer's market-to-book value, are also statistically insignificant when introduced independently. Results confirm that stock offers are not perceived unfavourably when compared to other payment methods within this subset. The coefficient of competition is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in all but one regression, indicating that our results for the entire sample are not merely driven by differences between the most competitive markets and the RoW. All other legal and institutional controls are statistically insignificant. 12 In
Specifications (11)- (14), we regress acquirer returns on competition and other explanatory variables only for the UUC subset. We do not include legal protection here as this takes a value of 50 for all three countries according to the index of Dahya et al. (2008) . The coefficient of the competition measure remains negative and significant at the 1% level indicating that timevarying competition is a key determinant of acquirer returns even among the most competitive markets. Although the coefficients of aggregate IO and independent directors are statistically insignificant when introduced independently, they both become positive and significant at the 1% level when introduced along with other controls. The coefficients of the remaining control variables have, in general, the same sign and similar magnitude with the regressions in which the entire sample is used. to target firms. We use the same control variables, but replace acquirer size and market-to-book value with target size and market-to-book value, respectively. In Regressions (1)-(5), both competition and legal protection are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This confirms that premiums and, accordingly, target returns increase with both competition and legal protection to the extent that these two effects are independent. In Regression (1), a one standard deviation increase in the competition measure increases target returns by 4.99%. If the IO and board independence indices reflect the IO and board independence of the target firm, then, ceteris paribus, more institutional and independent director presence would maximize the benefit for target shareholders. The percentages of IO and board independence are positive and significant at the 1% level, but the results are driven by the UUC. The stock dummy has a negative and significant coefficient suggesting that equity financing is associated with low returns for target firms as well as acquiring firms. The fact that lower premiums are normally observed in stock swaps may explain this result. The coefficients of target size and relative size are also both negative and significant at the 1% level, which may be associated with integration uncertainty and competition. The larger the target size, the more uncertain the success of its integration while there are also less potential buyers. Moreover, it appears that overvalued targets are acquired at a relative discount, pushing target returns lower as reflected in the negative and significant coefficient for the target's market-to-book value. Hostile acquisitions result in higher target returns, which can be explained by the higher premiums paid in this type of transaction (Bruner and Perella, 2004) . Finally, target returns are negatively related to past market performance. This effect is mainly driven by the UUC samples and may reflect the fact that lower premiums are offered during market up-turns (Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain, 2009 ).
Insert Table VI about here.
In Regressions (6)- (14), we repeat the same procedure for the RoW and UUC subsets.
The coefficient of time-varying competition remains positive and significant within both samples implying that our results for the entire sample are robust and not merely driven by systematically
higher competition values for UUC countries. Legal protection is also positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for the RoW sample, although other institutional characteristics are insignificant.
D. Competition and Premia
If acquirer returns decrease and target returns increase with time-varying competition, as has been established in this section, then it must be the case that competition compels acquirers to bid more aggressively and pay higher premia, which is detrimental to their shareholders'
wealth, but beneficial for target shareholders. If this is correct, then we should also find a positive correlation between competition and premia within the different subsets examined and, after controlling for other firm and deal characteristics, differences in the legal and institutional frameworks across markets and other country fixed effects. Table VII reports the regression results. In Regression (1), a 1% increase in the standard deviation of the competition index increases the premium by 5.83%. The coefficient of the competition measure is, in general, similar to the case of target returns' regressions. Although its coefficient decreases when adding country fixed effects or legal and institutional market characteristics, it still remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for all subsets, reflecting a compelling role of competition in determining takeover premia, both within the most competitive markets and in the RoW.
Legal protection is also a significant determinant of premiums. Its significance, however, is driven by differences between UUC and the RoW as the variable is insignificant within the RoW subset. The IO and independent directors' indices are also positively related with the premium in Specifications (4), (5), (13), and (14), but this is mainly driven by the U.S. Acquirer size, relative size, and market past performance (market-to-book) are (is) negatively (positively) associated with the premium for the entire sample and the UUC subset. For the RoW subset, most controls are statistically insignificant. The occurrence of a competing bidder and of an inter-industry transaction are both positively related to premia for all subsets.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we present new evidence regarding the gains from public M&As to acquiring and target firms using a worldwide sample covering 39 countries from all continents.
The existing literature points to significant differences in investor protection regulations and takeover activity across various countries. These characteristics are likely to have material impacts on competition for public targets, the premia paid, and the way investors perceive deal financing related information and, effectively, their reaction at the acquisition announcement.
Accordingly, we first demonstrate that public acquisition announcements, in general, enhance acquirers' value in countries beyond those with the most competitive takeover markets (the U.S., U.K., and Canada). Acquirers within the latter markets significantly underperform those in the rest of the world. Second, we also provide evidence that deals financed with equity swaps do not overall destroy value for acquirers in countries beyond the UUC. One potential explanation for the non-negative reaction in equity financed public acquisitions within the RoW is that the negative information effect of an equity offer can, in practice, be subdued by the positive effect of lower premiums paid due to inferior competition. Third, we find that RoW acquisitions are subject to superior synergy gains only for stock swaps, implying merely a redistribution of gains from the acquirer to the target in other types of transactions. Fourth, we examine the relationship between competition in the market for corporate control across time and markets and acquisition gains and premiums paid within the entire sample, as well as in the RoW and UUC subsets. Our findings indicate that the level of competition is negatively associated with acquirer returns and positively associated with target returns and premia after controlling for other firm, deal, and market legal and institutional characteristics, as well as other country fixed effects. Overall, the paper provides evidence that public acquisitions do generate gains, but the distribution of gains between acquiring and target firms depends on the degree of competition in the market for corporate control. As a result, the empirical observations relating public acquisitions to, at best, zero abnormal returns, and their equity financed subset to negative abnormal returns for acquiring firms around the deal announcement are mainly limited to the most competitive acquisition markets. The sample includes all acquisitions of listed targets reported in the Thomson Financial SDC global mergers and acquisitions database from 1990-2007 that meet the criteria described in Table I and that have complete method of payment data, are domestic, and are undertaken by public acquirers. The target-to-bidder relative market value and the value paid for the target are equal to or greater than 1% and $1 million, respectively. The bidder and its corresponding stock exchange have data available in the Thomson Financial Datastream. Transactions where the acquirer has multiple acquisition announcements within a five-day window surrounding the acquisition announcement are excluded. Summary statistics are presented for all transactions and by country/country group for the following: UUC (U.S., UK, and Canada), RoW (all markets excluding the U.S., UK, and Canada), U.S., UK, Canada, RoE (all European markets excluding the UK), Japan, RoA (all Asian markets excluding Japan), Oceania (Australia and New Zealand), South Africa, and South America. TV is the transaction value in millions of dollars. Acquirer (Target) MV is the equity market value of the bidder (target) in millions of dollars one month prior to the acquisition announcement. Relative Size is the target-to-bidder relative market value and acquirer (target) MTBV is the acquirer (target) market value divided by its net book value one month prior the acquisition announcement. Premium is the offer price divided by the target's stock price four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement and is reported for observations with values between zero and two. Cash offers are transactions financed with pure cash, stock offers include pure stock transactions while mixed/other offers comprise all remaining offers. Diversifying transactions involve targets with different two-digit SIC codes than that of the acquirer. Hostile deals is the percentage of deals reported in SDC as hostile and competing bids is the percentage of deals with at least one reported competing offer in SDC. %ACAR (%TCAR) is the acquirer's (target's) five-day cumulative abnormal return calculated by adding the market adjusted return for each acquirer for days t-2 to t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. To calculate the daily market return, the corresponding country's market index is used. Abnormal returns are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level. a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The sample includes all acquisitions of listed targets reported in the Thomson Financial SDC global mergers and acquisitions database from 1990-2007 that meet the criteria described in Table I and that have complete method of payment data, are domestic, and involve public acquirers. The target-to-bidder relative market value and the value paid for the target are equal to or greater than 1% and $1 million, respectively. The bidder and its corresponding stock exchange have data available in Thomson Financial Datastream. Transactions where the acquirer has multiple acquisition announcements within the five-day window surrounding the acquisition announcement are excluded. The five-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated by adding the market adjusted return for each acquirer for Days t-2 to t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. To calculate the daily market return, the corresponding country's market index is used. Abnormal returns are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level. Mean and median (below means) abnormal returns for acquiring firms are reported according to transaction country group: All, U.S., UK, Canada, RoE (all European markets excluding the UK), Japan, RoA (all Asian markets excluding Japan), Oceania (Australia and New Zealand), South Africa, South America, UUC (U.S., UK, and Canada) and RoW (all markets excluding the U.S., UK, and Canada). The sample size, n, is reported below the median returns. Cash offers are transactions financed with pure cash, stock offers include pure stock transactions while mixed/other offers comprise all remaining offers. The table also reports return differentials between RoW and UUC where the statistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests for means and Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for medians. a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The sample includes all acquisitions of listed targets reported in the Thomson Financial SDC global mergers and acquisitions database from 1990-2007 that meet the criteria described in Table III and where the target and its corresponding stock exchange have return data available in Thomson Financial Datastream. The five-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for target firms is calculated by adding the market adjusted return for each target for Days t-2 to t+2, where t is the acquisition announcement day. To calculate the daily market return, the corresponding country's market index is used. Combined returns are calculated using the market value-weighted average of the acquirer and target abnormal returns. Mean and median (below means) abnormal returns for target and combined returns are reported according to transaction country group: UUC (U.S., UK, and Canada) and RoW (all markets excluding the U.S., UK, and Canada). The sample size, n, is reported below median returns and the mean and median value of each characteristic below n. Cash offers are transactions financed with pure cash, stock offers include pure stock transactions while mixed/other offers comprise all remaining offers. The table also reports return differentials between RoW and UUC where the statistical significance is obtained using two sample t-tests for means and Wilcoxon sign-rank tests for medians. a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The table reports cross-sectional regression estimates of the five-day cumulative abnormal return to acquiring firms on competition and acquirer, legal, institutional, market, and deal characteristics. The sample includes all acquisitions of listed targets reported in the Thomson Financial SDC global mergers and acquisitions database from 1990-2007 that meet the criteria described in Table III . The five-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated by adding the market adjusted return for the bidder for Days t-2 to t+2 where t is the acquisition announcement day. To calculate the daily market return, the corresponding country's market index is used. In Specifications (1)- (5), estimates are reported for all deals, in Regressions (6)- (10) for RoW countries (all markets excluding the U.S., UK, and Canada), and in Specifications (11)- (14) for the UUC (U.S., UK, and Canada). The competition measure is based on the percentage of listed companies within a country targeted in completed deals in a specific year. The legal protection variable is a fixed cross-country legal protection index from Dahya et al. (2008) . This is the product of an anti-director rights indicator from La Porta et al. (1998) and the law and order indicator from icrgonline.com. The % institutional ownership variable is from Ferreira and Matos (2008) and measures the total institutional ownership in each country as a percentage of its stock market capitalization as of December 2005. The % independent directors is from Dahya et al. (2008) where the percentage of independent directors for each country is calculated as the mean number of independent directors scaled by the board size as of 2002. Stock financed is a binary variable that takes a value of one for stock swaps and zero otherwise. Acquirer size is the natural logarithm of the acquirer's equity market value in dollars one month prior to the acquisition announcement.
Transaction Region
Panel A. Target CARs
Relative size is the transaction value divided by the acquirer's market value, both in millions of dollars. Acquirer market-to-book value is the natural logarithm of the acquirer's market value divided by its net book value one month prior the acquisition announcement. Inter-Industry is a dummy equal to one if the two-digit SIC codes of the acquirer and the target are different. Hostile is a dummy that takes a value of one if the offer is hostile and zero otherwise. Competing bidder is an indicator variable taking a value of one when a competing bid for the same target is reported, and zero otherwise. Market's past performance is the average, six-month pre-event return of the corresponding market index. n is the sample size for each specification. Regressions (2), (7), and (12) control for country fixed effects, the coefficients of which are not reported. Adj. R 2 is the adjusted R squared. P-values are reported below regression coefficients. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
All
RoW UUC
(1) (6)- (10) for RoW countries (all markets excluding the U.S., UK, and Canada), and in Specifications (11)- (14) for the UUC (U.S., UK, and Canada). The competition measure is based on the percentage of listed companies within a country targeted in completed deals in a specific year. Legal protection variable is a fixed cross-country legal protection index from Dahya et al. (2008) . This is the product of an anti-director rights indicator from La Porta et al. (1998) and the law and order indicator from icrgonline.com. The % institutional ownership variable is from Ferreira and Matos (2008) and measures the total institutional ownership in each country as a percentage of its stock market capitalization as of December 2005. The % independent directors is from Dahya et al. (2008) where the percentage of independent directors for each country is calculated as the mean number of independent directors scaled by the board size as of 2002. Stock financed is a binary variable that takes a value of one for stock swaps and zero otherwise. Target size is the natural logarithm of the target's equity market value in dollars one month prior to the acquisition announcement. Relative size is the transaction value divided by the acquirer's market value, both in millions of dollars. Target market-to-book value is the natural logarithm of the target's market value divided by its net book value one month prior the acquisition announcement. Inter-Industry is a dummy equal to one if the two-digit SIC codes of the acquirer and the target are different. Hostile is a dummy that takes a value of one if the offer is hostile and zero otherwise. Competing bidder is an indicator variable taking a value of one when a competing bid for the same target is reported, and zero otherwise. Market's past performance is the average, six-month pre-event return of the corresponding market index. Regressions (2), (7), and (12) control for country fixed effects, the coefficients of which are not reported. n is the sample size for each specification. Adj. R 2 is the adjusted R squared. P-values are reported below regression coefficients. a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) Table III . Premium is the offer price divided by the target's stock price four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement and is reported for observations with values between zero and two. In Specifications (1)- (5) estimates are reported for all deals, in Regressions (6)- (10) for RoW countries (all markets excluding the U.S., UK, and Canada), and in Specifications (11)- (14) for the UUC (U.S., UK, and Canada). The competition measure is based on the percentage of listed companies within a country targeted in completed deals in a specific year. The legal protection variable is a fixed cross-country legal protection index from Dahya et al. (2008) . This is the product of an anti-director rights indicator from La Porta et al. (1998) and the law and order indicator from icrgonline.com. The % institutional ownership variable is from Ferreira and Matos (2008) and measures the total institutional ownership in each country as a percentage of its stock market capitalization as of December 2005. The % independent directors is from Dahya et al. (2008) where the percentage of independent directors for each country is calculated as the mean number of independent directors scaled by the board size as of 2002. Stock financed is a binary variable that takes a value of one for stock swaps and zero otherwise. Acquirer size is the natural logarithm of the acquirer's equity market value in dollars one month prior to the acquisition announcement. Relative size is the transaction value divided by the acquirer's market value, both in millions of dollars. Acquirer market-tobook value is the natural logarithm of the acquirer's market value divided by its net book value one month prior the acquisition announcement. Inter-Industry is a dummy equal to one if the two-digit SIC codes of the acquirer and the target are different. Hostile is a dummy that takes a value of one if the offer is hostile and zero otherwise. Competing bidder is an indicator variable taking a value of one when a competing bid for the same target is reported, and zero otherwise. Market's past performance is the average, sixmonth pre-event return of the corresponding market index. Regressions (2), (7), and (12) control for country fixed effects, the coefficients of which are not reported. n is the sample size for each specification. Adj. R 2 is the adjusted R squared. P-values are reported below regression coefficients. a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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